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1. INTRODUCTION
Peer review of health care professionals has become a standard process in
hospitals and many other health care facilities. State legislatures have
encouraged good faith peer review in three major ways: by providing
1 Partner, Bricker & Eckler, Cleveland, Ohio. B.A., Kent State University 1975; M.A.
Political Science, The Ohio State University 1977; J.D. (cum laude), Capital University
Law School 1982.
2 Associate, Bricker & Eckler, Columbus, Ohio. B.A. (magna cum laude), Northern
Arizona University 1975; M.A., University of Washington 1980; J.D. (with honors), The
Ohio State University College of Law 1989.
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
immunity from damages to peer review participants; by making peer review
information privileged and thus not admissible in certain judicial and/or
administrative proceedings; and by requiring that peer review participants
keep information regarding the peer review process confidential.
These legal protections of the peer review process-immunity, privilege and
confidentiality-while related, are distinct concepts. Quite obviously health
care professionals will be reluctant to participate in the peer review process if
they later may find themselves subject to damages for their participation.
Therefore, the granting of immunity from damages to peer review participants
is one of the most important ways of encouraging effective peer review.
Congress passed the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 19863
("HCQIA") with the express purpose of promoting peer review by limiting
potential liability of the participants. 4 Most states have enacted similar
immunity provisions. 5 Immunity granted to peer review participants by
342 U.S.C.A. §§ 11101, 11111-11152 (West Supp. 1993). The HCQIA provides
standards forprofessional review activities. For example, professional review action, as
defined in the Act, must be taken "in the reasonable belief that the action was in the
furtherance of quality health care" and "after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of
the matter." 42 U.S.C.A. § 11112(a). Theother HCQIA standards are discussed in Section
II. The Act provides that professional review actions will bepresumed to have met these
standards unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. The
Act further identifies certain requirements necessary to meet the adequate notice and
hearing standard. These requirements govern the types of notice that must be given the
affected physician and the conduct of the hearing.
4 1f the HCQIA standards are met, certain immunities from damages are available.
In addition, if a hospital or other health care entity covered by the Act follows the
adequate notice and fair hearing procedures outlined in the Act, court review should
be limited to whether the affected physician received these protections. If the court
determines that the standards have been met, the case should be dismissed with respect
to those covered by the Act.
5 For a general discussion of state peer review statutes, see B. Abbott Goldberg, The
Peer Review Privilege: A Law in Search of a Valid Policy, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 151, 154 (1984);
Note, Medical Peer Review Protection in the Health Care Industry, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 552, 558
(1979); Note, Restructuring Hospital-Physician Relations: Patient Care Quality Depends on
the Health of Hospital Peer Review, 51 U. PRTT. L. REV. 1025, 1033 (1990) ("At present this
fear is uncomfortably realistic.") (citations omitted).
Many states specifically identify the bases for enactment of the peer review
protections: Arkansas, comment to subchapter 5 ("it is essential to the proper and
effective operations of [peer review] committees that immunity be granted members of
such committees for acts of the members performed within the scope of the functions
of the committee and without malice and fraud"); Hawaii, HAw. REV. STAT. § 671D-2
("purposeof this chapter is to provide incentives and protection for physicians engaging
in effective professional peer review"); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-219(a)(1) ("It
is the stated policy of Tennessee to encourage committees made up of Tennessee's
licensed physicians to candidly, conscientiously, and objectively evaluate and review
their peers' professional conduct, competence, and ability to practice medicine.
Tennessee further recognizes that confidentiality is essential to both effective
functioning of these peer review committees and to continued improvement in the care
and treatment of patients.")
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federal and state law has been commented upon widely6 and generally is
outside the scope of this article.
Despite the immunity for participation in peer review proceedings, health
care professionals may still be reluctant to participate in the peer review process
if they fear information regarding the process may later be admitted into a
judicial or administrative proceeding. They may also be concerned that they
may be called upon to testify against their colleagues or that the information
regarding the proceedings and their role in such proceedings may otherwise
be revealed to third parties. While there appears to be widespread belief that
information presented in peer review proceedings and the deliberation of such
committees are privileged and are to remain confidential, the reality is that peer
review proceedings are afforded very little privilege and confidentiality
protection pursuant to federal law and very inconsistent protection by state
law. Most states have a peer review privilege statute, yet many of these statutes
significantly limit the applicability of the privilege and permit the information
to be released in judicial and administrative proceedings. There is similarly
little protection of peer review information and the attendant privileges,
immunities, or confidentiality of such information pursuant to federal law.
7
Many state laws provide that peer review information is to remain
confidential. However, only a very few states give any guidance as to how this
confidentiality protection is to be interpreted or provide any sanctions for
violation of these confidentiality requirements.8 Without sanctions for
violation of the confidentiality provisions, the protection granted may be
rendered almost meaningless. Similar to the law on privileges, federal law
offers little confidentiality protection to peer review records. 9
6 See note 3, supra; see also James T. Hicks, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in
Application of Peer Review Privilege Statutes, 24 J. HEALTH & HosP. L 137 (1991); Charity
Scott, Medical Peer Review, Antitrust, and the Effect of Statutory Reform, 50 MD. L. REV. 316
(1991); Comment, The Medical Review Committee Privilege: A Jurisdictional Survey, 67
N.C.L. REV. 179 (1988); Reed E. Hall, Hospital Committee Proceeding Reports: Their Legal
Status, 1 AM. J.L. & MED. 245 (1975).
7 The only federal statute that makes specific provision for peer review activities is
the HCQIA. This Act does not create a privilege per se, although it does give some
protections to good faith reporting of information in the context of peer review actions
if the requirements identified in the Act have been met. The Act does make some
provisions for confidentiality, as discussed in Section W(C), of the information required
to be reported under the Act, but this information does not include by definition any
information related during a professional review action.
8 For example, Texas makes the unauthorized and unlawful disclosure of
confidential peer review information by the state board of registration a Class A
misdemeanor. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 5.06(s)(4). Rhode Island imposes
both civil and criminal penalties. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-9. New Mexico classifies a
violation of its peer review statute as a petty misdemeanor and provides for a minimal
fine ($100) and/or imprisonment not to exceed 6 months. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-9-6.
9Again, the HCQIA mandates that certain types of information be reported to the
National Practitioner Data Bank ("NPDB"), which was created as a result of the HCQIA.
The types of information that must be reported are described in Section IV(C).
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This article will discuss the status of the privileges and confidentiality
protection today at both the state and federal level. It will also address the
concerns present among those individuals and organizations participating in
peer review regarding the law of privileges and confidentiality and offer
suggestions for health care providers to take full advantage of the statutory
protections.
I. PEER REVIEW
"Peer review." The phrase conjures up general images of physicians and
hospital staff members meeting to review and discuss the quality of care
rendered on an on-going basis in a hospital or other health care setting. More
specifically, it includes the review of individual physicians and other health
care professionals appointed to the medical staff of a hospital or other health
care organization when there are quality of care concerns with respect to the
health care services provided by that individual.
In reality, what is encompassed within peer review activities that will fall
within the statutory peer review protections varies widely from state to state.
Some states specifically define the functions that are protected; others broadly
apply to "peer review" or "medical review" committees. Within these
definitions of peer review activities, peer review may encompass the initial
review and decision-making process with respect to medical staff appointment
and reappointment and the delineation of clinical privileges, both with respect
to initial appointments and requests for modifications or expansion of clinical
privileges at other times. Whether or not this function falls within the statutory
definition, peer review in the form of utilization review and quality assessment
and improvement activities is an important element of the continual
monitoring and assessment of quality of care in hospitals and other health care
The HCQIA provides that these reports are to be confidential and are not to be
disclosed,except "with respect to [certain] professional review activity" identified in the
Act. The Act also provides that any disclosure authorized by state law will not be
prevented by the Act. If information is reported in a manner that does not allow the
identification of the physician, patient, any other health care practitioner, or the health
care entity, that information will not be considered confidential and may be disclosed.
Although at this time, this information is, under most circumstances, available only to
licensing boards and certain health care entities, such as hospitals and other entities that
provide health care services and that follow formal peer review processes, there are
continuing efforts to have the information in the Data Bank more widely available to
the public.
One option proposed by the Clinton administration as part of its reform plan is
limited access to the NPDB by consumers that would allow consumers to discover if a
practitioner is a "repeat offender." Such efforts are strongly opposed by organized
medicine, but consumergroups are becoming more active and wider access may result.
See Linda Oberman, Data Bank Access Debate: Any middle ground? AMERICAN MEDICAL
NEWS, Jan. 3, 1994, pp. 3-4.
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facilities, including professional associations.10 It is required by the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations ("JCAHO") and the
American Osteopathic Association ("AOA"), both of which are private bodies
by which hospitals and other health care organizations may receive
accreditation which is also useful for federal certification for Medicare and state
licensing purposes."
As noted above, the peer review process is performed in large part by health
care professionals who are appointees to a health care organization's medical
staff. Underlying peer review is the responsibility of a health care facility, which
can be imposed by law or accreditation agency or be self-imposed, to permit
only competent, capable persons to engage in the practice of medicine or the
provision of other health care services at the health care facility. Since the board
and administration of individual health care facilities generally are comprised
of persons who are not thought to be qualified to evaluate the quality of medical
10 Beca use the majority of peer review is performed at the hospital level, the
comments in this article will be generally addressed to hospital-based peer review.
However, the discussion will be applicable to peer review in other health care settings
as well. The same analysis may also be useful when examining privilege, confidentiality,
and immunity issues in the context of peer review in other fields.
1lToday'sJCAHO grows out of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals,
which was founded in 1952. Although not a government entity, JCAHO accreditation
is sought by health care organizations because organizations who are accredited by
JCAHO are deemed eligible to participate in the Medicare program. Over the years,
compliance with JCAHO standards has become an accepted method of achieving
accreditation for the majority of hospitals in the United States.
The JCAHO standards, which are published annually in the organization's
Accreditation Manual for Hospitals, specifically require the development and
implementation of mechanisms to assure "the uniform performance of patient care
processes throughout the organm~zation." JCAHO Standard, LD.1.6 (1994) (the
equivalent of this standard was formerly found in the Governing Board Standards at
GB.1.16.1 ("The governing body requires mechanisms to assure that all patients with
the same health problem are receiving the same level of care in the hospital." GB.1.16.1
(1993)). The 1994 Standards have significantly reorganized the standards and regrouped
some of the medical staff and governing board requirements from prior years within a
new section titled "Improving Organizational Performance." Also included in this new
section are many of the standards found in the Quality Assessment and Improvement
section of the 1993 Accreditation Manual for Hospitals. The first standard within this new
section requires "tihe organization [to have] a planned, systematic, organizationwide
approach to designing, measuring, assessing, and improving its performance." JCAHO
Standard, PI.1 (1994).
The AOA also has an accreditation program for health care facilities and annually
publishes standards by which it conducts surveys of health care facilities. The AOA's
program has also been granted "deemed" status to conduct surveys of health care
facilities for compliance with Health Care Financing Administration requirements. The
AOA standards similarly require review of practitioners' competence to perform
services for which they have been granted privileges and the maintenance of a high level
of professional competence and knowledge.
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and other health care services provided at the facility, this task is delegated to
the health care professionals practicing at each health care facility.' 2
Depending upon the size of the health care organization, the individuals
performing peer review and the person reviewed may work together on a daily
basis and may even practice in the same specialty. Concerns on the part of the
health care professionals participating in the peer review process with the
nature and discoverability of peer review proceedings and information
generated within those proceedings, as well as immunities from suit and
testimonial privileges, are evident. Equally important, however, are the
concerns of the health care organization itself with the confidentiality of the
information generated within the peer review process and available
immunities from suit and damages for its participation in and conducting of
the process.
Peer review information may have many uses outside of the hospital
credentialling process. Information presented to peer review committees and
the deliberations of such committees may be useful to plaintiffs and defendants
in malpractice lawsuits. It could also prove useful to third party payers in
making payment decisions and in determining which providers may
participate on select provider panels. News media, consumer groups, and
competitor health care providers may all be very interested in peer review
information for a variety of reasons.
In contrast, participants in the peer review process may be reluctant to
participate or to be totally open in such proceedings if they believe they may
be later called into court to testify or if their comments and role in the process
may later be revealed to third parties. While a physician may be willing to
chastise a physician in private and, for example, suggest sanctions such as
remedial training, the physician almost assuredly would not like his comments
aired on the six o'clock news.
In the absence of law to the contrary, parties may obtain discovery regarding
any matter not privileged.13 Similarly, absent law or agreement to the contrary,
no person is required to keep any information confidential. Therefore, without
specific provisions of law, peer review information would be subject to
discovery, and there would be no requirement that peer review participants
keep the information confidential. Even agreements to keep peer review
12 State peer review statutes provide protection to a variety of persons serving as
members of peer review committees or otherwise providing service to the committee.
Most broadly, committee members, consisting of both health care professionals and
hospital staff and administration employees, together with consultants hired to assist
in the evaluation process, and any other persons involved and providing services, such
as legal counsel, are protected. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.23.020. In the leastprotective
states, only health care professionals (i.e., physicians in most cases) are afforded the
statutory protections. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.035(2). Some states describe the
required composition of peer review committees. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §
34-4-12.6-1(c)(2).
13 See, e.g., OHIO R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
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information confidential would be ineffective in preventing its disclosure
pursuant to legal process.
14
To encourage open peer review, the overwhelming majority of state
legislatures 15 have adopted statutory protections for the peer review process.
16
The nature of these statutory protections varies from state to state. The
protections take the following forms: providing immunity from suit or
damages for those individuals participating in the peer review process;
granting a privilege from discovery or admission into evidence to peer review
information; and providing that peer review information is to remain
confidential.
II. PEER REVIEW IMMuNITY
While this article does not provide an analysis of the various state laws
regarding immunity as this is adequately covered in other writings, 17 some
discussion of such laws and the HCQIA is necessary to understand the
privilege and confidentiality protections afforded the peer review process by
the states.
For example, when an individual applies for medical staff appointment at a
health care organization and is denied appointment or granted a conditional
appointment with fewer clinical privileges than requested or granted restricted
privileges, that individual may initiate a lawsuit against the health care
organization and/or participants on the committees that considered the
application and made recommendations for the denial of appointment or the
granting of limited or restricted clinical privileges. Similarly, an appointee to
the health care organization's medical staff may file a lawsuit when the
14 For example, medical staff bylaws should impose confidentiality requirements
upon medical staff appointees serving on peer review committees. In addition, any
consultant retained to assist in the review process should by agreement be bound to
similar confidentiality provisions. However, these agreements would be ineffective
should a court order disclosure of information that is not made confidential or privileged
by law.
15Apparently, Oklahoma is the only state that has not adopted a peer review statute.
Oklahoma has enacted a Hospital and Medical Services Utilization Review Act, OKLA.
STAT. tit. 36, §§ 6551 to 6561, which provides for utilization review for insurance
purposes.
16 See Dorothy Rasinski Gregory, Immunity for Physicians in Peer-Review Committees,
MED. TR. TECH. Q, pp. 193-202 (1985) ("the law quickly realized that without some
degree of confidentiality of peer-review documents and proceedings, total candor could
not be guaranteed" (id. at 194)). The author voiced the common concern held by health
care professionals that "[mlembers of the medical profession cannot be expected to
initiate or willingly participate in peer-review investigations if their testimony and
reports may be subjected to discovery in subsequent civil litigation involving issues far
beyond the area of the committee's actions." Id. at 196.
The first state legislature to adopt legislation creating a peer review privilege was
Illinois in 1961. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 152.
17See, e.g., supra notes 5 and 6.
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appointee's privileges or appointment is terminated or restricted as a result of
an investigation arising out of quality of care concerns that are the subject of
internal peer review proceedings. Such lawsuits may be brought at the state or
federal level 18 and can allege causes of action including defamation, tortious
interference with a business relationship, and antitrust. The fear of becoming
embroiled in lawsuits as a result of candid discussion within the peer review
process is recognized as a deterrent to effective peer review.19
As alluded previously, the immunities provided for peer review information
and participants vary among the states, ranging from no immunities to
individuals and entities participating in peer review activities to the grant of
immunity from damages and/or suit to members of certain committees
identified in the state statute that perform peer review functions20 when acting
on behalf of the committee within the scope of its authority. In addition, any
immunities granted are narrowly construed according to the terms of the
18As will be discussed later in this article, whether a lawsuit is brought in state or
federal courts determines the availability of privileges, which may be recognized under
state law, but may not be similarly recognized under federal law.
19See Restructuring Hospital-Physician Relations, supra note 5. In that note, the
author states that "[tlhe most serious obstacle to effective peer review is the potential
fear felt by the reviewer that participation in an adverse recommendation will lead to a
lawsuit against him or her personally," id. at 1033, and cites an article appearing in the
August 20, 1984 issue of Medical Economics titled Peer Review: Is Testifying Worth the
Hassle? and a statement by Representative David Waxman appearing in the
Congressional Record that "[alt the hearing [held for debate over barriers to peer
review], nearly every witness indicated that the threat of litigation under current law is
a major barrier to effective peer review." 132 CONG. REC. Hi1588 (daily ed. Oct. 17,1986).
These congressional proceedings preceded the enactment of the HCQIA at the federal
level. See also Note, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Will Physicians Find
Peer Review More Inviting?, 74 VA. L. REV. 1115, 1119 (1988) ("One fear of physicians is
involvement in litigation either in the form of a suit filed by a physician who has been
denied staff privileges or a malpractice suit filed by a patient of the physician under
review.")
See also Scott, supra note 6, at 327 ("Whether the belief is justified or not, many
physicians believe that to serve in any peer-review capacity is necessarily to risk being
named in a lawsuit.").
But see Scott supra note 6, at 327 n.42, citing Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986: Hearings on H.R. 5540 BRebre the Subcomnm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
House Comni. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1986), at pp. 96-99, 121-23 (no
evidence that legisla tion is needed), and 132 CONG. REC. H9961 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986)
(statement by Rep. Edwards that "peer review participants' fear of damage claims is
unfounded.... The view of several witnesses was, 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it."). The
cited references suggest, "[allthough there was considerable testimony about the chilling
effect that litigation was thought to have on peer review,.., some vigorously disputed
both the fact of and the basis for such deterrence."
20 See OHIO REV. CODE § 2305.25 and § 2305.28, both of which grant immunity from
damages to persons acting within the scope of certain committees identified in the
statutes. Cf. this language to that contained in the HCQIA, which does not specifically
grant immunities from suit, but does limit damages with respect to professional review
actions when these actions meet the standards listed in the Act.
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statutory grant. No immunity is given to individuals who are not identified in
the statute or who serve on committees that are not included on the statutory
list. For example, if the statute reads that certain individuals performing certain
functions will be immune from damages, but not immune from suit, courts will
strictly interpret the statute to provide immunity only from damages, but not
from any other actions. 21 Similarly, the immunity from damages does not give
peer review participants immunity from criminal prosecution or other
non-damage actions, such as injunctive or declaratory relief, unless specifically
provided in the statute. Any immunities granted under state law, as with
privileges and confidentiality, will have no application if a lawsuit is brought
in the federal courts.
Until the enactment of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 198622
by Congress, peer review in the health care field was governed exclusively by
state legislation. The HCQIA, the only federal legislation on the subject, was
enacted specifically to encourage peer review by physicians. 23 The HCQIA
represented the federal Congress' finding that "It]here is an overriding national
need to provide incentive and protection for physicians engaging in effective
professional peer review.' 24 Congress further found that "[tihe threat of private
money damage liability under Federal laws, including treble damage liability
under Federal antitrust law, unreasonably discourages physicians from
participating in effective professional peer review.'
25
The protections actually provided by the HCQIA are limited, as courts
applying the Act have found.26 The plain words of the Act limit the immunity
2 1See Decker v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 982 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 113 S.
Ct. 3041 (1993) (federal court found that state statute (Utah Medical Practice Act)
provided protection from damages only, not immunity from suit, for participation in
peer review activities).
2242 U.S.C.A. § 11101, 11111-11152 (West Supp. 1993).
23 For a discussion of the HCQIA, see Kathleen L. Blaner, Physician, Heal Thyself.
Because the Cure, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act, May be Worse than the Disease,
37 CATH. U.L. REv 1073 (1988); The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, supra,
note 19.
2442 U.S.C.A. § 11101(5).
2542 U.S.C.A. § 11101(4).
26The HCQIA provides immunities from damages, but some courts have found that
it does not provide immunity from suit. While physicians who participate in peer review
activities that fall within the protections of the HCQIA will undoubtedly be dismissed
from a lawsuit brought against them at an early stage in the litigation, the act does not
explicitly provide them with immunity from suit. See Decker, 982 F.2d 433 (neither the
Utah Medical Practice Act nor the HCQIA provided immunity from suit; the acts
provided protection "only from damages arising from participation in private actions,
and only for proper peer review") Id. at 437; Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728 (9th Cir.
1992) (court of appeals upheld district court's granting of summary judgment against
physician participant in peer review proceedings when it determined peer reviewers
complied with HCQIA due process requirements); Smith v. Ricks, 798 F. Supp. 605 (N.D.
Cal. 1992) (plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption of immunity for denial of
1992-93]
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from damages to those individuals who participate and provide information
to professional review bodies "unless such information is false and the person
providing it knew that such information was false."27 Professional review
bodies, persons who act as a member of the professional review body, persons
acting under a formal agreement or contract with the professional review body,
and any other person who participates and/or assists the professional review
body with the action is also granted immunity from civil damages.
28
The HCQIA also provides standards for professional review actions that
must be met before the peer review body or individuals described in the Act
will be entitled to the immunities from damages provided in the Act. To qualify
for the protections of the Act, the following conditions must be met:
[a] professional review action must be taken-
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance
of quality health care,
(2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter,
(3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded
to the physician involved or after such other procedures as
are fair to the physician under the circumstances, 29 and
(4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the
facts known after such reasonable effort to obtain facts and
after meeting the requirement of paragraph (3).30
The HCQIA provides a basis against which effective peer review can be
measured when professional review actions have the adverse effect of
privileges afforded by the HCQIA). See also Manion v. Evans, 986 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 71 (1993) (HCQIA provides immunity to physician and hospitals
participating in peer review activities from liability for damages in civil actions; it does
not immunize physicians and hospitals from suit as a result of their participation in peer
review activities).
2742 U.S.C.A. § 11111(a)(2).
2842 U.S.C.A. § 11111(a)(1).
29Section 11112(b) of the Act details the requirements that must be fulfilled for a
health care entity to bedeemed to have met the adequate notice and hearing requirement
of Section 11112(a)(3). These requirements include notice to the affected physician of the
proposed action, which must include the reasons for the proposed action, inform the
physician that he/she has the right to request a hearing on theproposed action (the time
within which to request such a hearing cannot be limited to less than 30 days), and a
summary of the hearing rights available to the physician. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11112(b)(1). The
notice of proposed action must be followed by a notice of hearing when the physician
requests a hearing within the time provided in the notice of proposed action. The notice
of hearing must contain the place, time, and date of the hearing, a date not less than 30
days after the date of the notice, and a list of witnesses expected to testify on behalf of
the professional review body. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11112(b)(2). These hearing rights include
the right to be represented by counsel or another person of choice, to call, examine, and
cross-examine witnesses, to present evidence, and to submit a written statement at the
close of the hearing. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11112(b)(3).
301d. § 11112(a).
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"reducing, restricting, suspending, revoking, denying, or failing to renew
clinical privileges or membership in a health care entity."31 Professional review
actions are limited to those actions taken or made in the conduct of professional
review activity that is "based on the competence or professional conduct of an
individual physician (which conductaffects or could affect adversely the health
or welfare of a patient or patients) and which affects (or may affect) adversely
the clinical privileges, or membership in a professional society, of the
physician."32 While the HCQIA may do no more than provide a framework
within which peer review should be conducted, that alone is a step in the right
direction for effective peer review.
IV. PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE
The peer review privilege has developed as an "institutional privilege"-a
privilege which protects the institution and participants and not necessarily
the person being subjected to peer review. Courts have been reluctant to adopt
a common law peer review privilege and so the privilege if it exists at all flows
from statutory enactment. The statutes which exist are not consistent and do
not seem to address adequately the underlying reason for the privilege.
A. Privileges
"Privilege" in the law is the right to keep certain information from being used
in evidence. The recognition of a privilege with respect to communications
between parties or with respect to an institution's self-examination of its
activities represents "an exception to the general liability of every person to give
testimony upon all facts inquired of in a court of justice."33 At common law no
privilege is created by the "mere fact that a communication was made in express
confidence, or in the implied confidence of a confidential relation."34 Wigmore,
one of the foremost authorities on privileges, delineated four conditions
necessary before a privilege against the disclosure of certain communications
and information may be established.
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered.
311Id. § 11151 (1).
32Id. § 11151(9).
338 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961), 1 2285, p. 527.
341d. at 528.
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(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure
of the communications must be greater than the ben35ft
thereby gained for the correct disposal of the litigation.
Courts have been very reluctant to create common law privileges absent
statutory authority and generally strictly construe those privileges that do
exist. The United States Supreme Court has continually admonished courts to
be cautious in fashioning privileges. Even in discussing the widely accepted
attorney-client and priest-penitent privileges, the Court has urged caution in
their application:
These and other interests [referring to the privileges held by attorneys
and priests] are recognized in law by privileges against forced
disclosure, established in the Constitution, by statute, or at common
law. Whatever their origins, "these exceptions to the demand for every
man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for
they are in derogation of the search for truth."
36
3 5 d. (emphasis in original).
3 6 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). The footnote to this portion of the
decision quotes Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
234 (1960):
Limitations are properly placed upon the operation of this general
principle only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal
to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good trans-
cending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational
means for ascertaining truth.
See also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,50 (1980) ("Testimonial exclusionary rules
and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that 'the public.., has a right to
every man's evidence'....") (citations omitted).
The most recent United States Supreme Court decision to address this issue
occurred in the context of academic peer review proceedings. In University of
Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990), the Court was called upon to "fashion a new
privilege [claimed by petitioner to be] necessary to protect the integrity of the peer
review process, which in turn is central to the proper functioning of many colleges and
universities." Id. a t 189. The Court declined, stating:
We do not create and apply an evidentiary privilege unless it "promotes
sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative
evidence....
Moreover, although Rule 501 manifests a congressional desire "not
to freeze the law of privilege" but rather to provide the courts with
flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis, ....
we are disinclined to exercise this authority expansively. We are
especially reluctant to recognize a privilege in an area where it appears
that Congress has considered the relevant competing concerns but has
not provided the privilege itself.... The balancing of conflicting interests
of this type is particularly a legislative function.
Id. (citations omitted).
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B. Peer Review Privilege
It is generally accepted that the privilege ascribed to peer review proceedings
does not arise from any recognized common law principle,37 but is rather a
legislative creation developed to protect facets of peer review proceedings in
order to encourage open and effective peer review.38 The peer review privilege
is one of the privileges characterized as an institutional privilege which protects
confidentiality of communications not because of the importance to the
individuals involved but due to the importance of the protection to the
institutions (and indirectly the public) relying upon the privilege.39 Clearly the
peer review privilege was created to encourage peer review and thus protect
the institutions performing peer review and not to protect the individuals who
were subject to review.
Peer review itself is a relatively recent development and stems from the
health care profession's concern with establishing a minimal standard of care
for health care services provided to the public. 4° Today's tradition of
self-regulation and evaluation within the health care profession flows from
early attempts by hospitals to regulate the quality of care provided within their
walls. With the development of the accreditation organizations, such as the
JCAHO and AOA's Committee on Hospital Accreditation, and state licensing
regulations, the requirements for the peer review process have been imposed
3 7 See The Medical Review Committee Privilege: A Jurisdictional Survey, supra note 6, at
189 ("[w]hether medical review records were afforded any privilege at common law is
at best uncertain").
3 8 See Section IV(C) infra.
3 9 Note, Dcvelopments in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 HARV, L. REV. 1450,
1592 (1985).
40Formal medical education in the United States did not begin until 1765 when a
chair was founded at the College of Philadelphia. Note, Medical Peer Review Protection
in the Health Care Industry, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 552, 554 (1979). Hospitals at that time were
generally not-for-profit private institutions and frequently developed out of
almshouses. Minimal standards for medical graduates were set by the American
Medical Association when it was established in 1847 as a means to attempt to establish
a minimum level of competence in the profession. Id. Later states adopted regulations
for the licensing of physicians. Id.
Continuing the movement toward monitoring of physicians by their peers, which
developed out of a concern for the poor quality of health care providers, the American
College of Surgeons was organized in 1913. Id. Membership in the College was based
on professional qualifications and merit. Id. at 554-55. As one commentator describes
the College, it:
[s]ought to establish standard requirements for hospital quality of
care.... The standards favored close-staff hospitals, where staff
membership is a privilege conferred solely on merit as determined
by the hospital.... A procedure of medical audit, a form of peer
review, was recommended during this time, but the innovation was
not instituted until decades later as hospital medical staff standards
and review became more rigorous.
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from outside the health care institution. "The conventional justification for the
privilege is that protecting doctors from testifying against their colleagues
promotes candor during peer review proceedings."4 1
The issue before the courts and legislatures is how to give health care
professionals the protections and immunities necessary to promote thorough
and effective peer review and at the same time allow certain information from
the peer review proceedings to be used in a meaningful way.42
C. Federal Peer Review Privilege
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides that parties may obtain
discovery regarding any matter not privileged which is relevant to the subject
matter in the action. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that
for federal civil cases based upon state claims (generally diversity cases) the
determination of privilege is based upon the state law being applied in that
specific case. With all other federal cases where federal law is applied, whether
or not communications are privileged is based upon federal statute and if none
exists, by common law as interpreted by the federal courts. There is no federal
statute granting a peer review privilege and therefore whatever peer review
privilege protection there is falls to the federal courts to fashion. The federal
courts, however, have been reluctant to adopt common law privileges in
general, even rejecting a physician-patient privilege in federal cases.43 Likewise
the federal courts have been reluctant to adopt a common law peer review
privilege, although this is not absolute.
In Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc.,44 the most widely cited case for adopting
a federal peer review privilege, the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia denied discovery in a malpractice case of reports made to hospital
committees on the grounds that, absent extraordinary circumstances, a hospital
is entitled to a qualified privilege of information submitted to committees
formed pursuant to JCAHO guidelines for the "sole objective" of improving
available care and treatment for its patients. 45 Despite the holding in Bredice,
41 See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 5, at 154.
42 See Scott, supra note 6, at 319 ("We ought to give immunity to doctors to participate
in peer review in order to encourage that peer review, but we have to protect the public
by making the information available from peer review to an institution so that
information will be used in a meaningful way.").
43 See, e.g., In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983);
United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976).
4450 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), affd mern. 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
45Accord Laws v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., Inc., 656 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1987);
Gillman v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Robinson v. Magovem, 83 F.R.D.
79 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
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most federal courts addressing the issue have refused to adopt a common law
peer review privilege.
46
While the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of a federal
health care peer review privilege, the Court recently addressed the issue of peer
review in the academic setting and refused to recognize a common law
privilege against disclosure of confidential peer review information:
We do not. create and apply an evidentiary privilege unless it
"promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for
probative evidence .... Inasmuch as "[t]estimonial exclusionary rules
and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that 'the public
... has a right to every man's evidence,.. . any such privilege must be
strictly construed."' 4(citations omitted).
It is unlikely that the United States Supreme Court, if faced with the issue of
health care peer review would hold differently.
While there is little support for a federal peer review privilege at common
law, neither is there a statutory basis for a medical peer review privilege in
federal law. The HCQIA statutorily granted antitrust immunity to medical peer
review participants when the review conforms to the standards of the Act. The
HCQIA, however, did not grant any privilege to the proceedings of peer review
committees. Presumably Congress would have addressed the issue of privilege
if it intended for a privilege to be granted. The Act does provide for the limited
confidentiality of information reported to hospitals from the NPDB
Information reported under this subchapter is considered confidential
and shall not be disclosed (other than to the physician or practitioner
involved) except with respect to professional review activity...
Nothing in this subsection shall prevent the disclosure of such
information by a party which is otherwise authorized, under
applicable State law, to make such disclosure.
48
The court in LeMasters v. Christ Hospital,49 held that this portion of the Act
provides for confidentiality of only that information provided to the NPDB and
does not create any type of peer review privilege.
Another basis for the privilege argued for with respect to peer review
proceedings is the newly emerging privilege recognized for self-evaluative
46See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. for McHenry County v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir.
1981); Pagano v. Oroville Hosp., 145 F.R.D. 683 (E.D. Cal. 1993); Teasdale v. Marin Gen.
Hosp., 138 F.R.D. 691 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Wei v. Bodner, 127 F.R.D. 91 (D.NJ. 1989); Quinn
v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Del. 1985); Dorsten v. Lapeer County Gen.
Hosp., 88 F.R.D. 583 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
47University of Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 189 (citations omitted).
4842 U.S.C.A. § 11137(b)(1).
49791 F. Supp. 188 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
1992-93]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
processes. As stated above, the Bredice decision is recognized as the first case to
allow for a privilege based upon a self-evaluative basis.50 From that beginning,
the "general public policy favoring confidentiality for self-criticism has been
expanded and applied, although by no means uniformly, to protect documents
in other contexts, including police department investigations and academic
peer reviews."51
One commentator has described the purpose for the development of the
self-critical analysis privilege as a means "to foster, within a given institution,
frank deliberations designed to improve the institution's mission. ' 52 The
privilege is generally described as a qualified privilege and its application is
determined on a case-by-case basis. Three factors have been recognized by
courts when determining whether the self-criticism privilege applies. These
include: (1) the document must result from an institution's internal
investigation conducted to review or evaluate the institution's procedures or
products; (2) it must have been the intent of the institution that the document
remain confidential and it must remain confidential for the institution to
function effectively; and (3) "protecting the communication must be in the
public interest and serve an important public need."53
By far the most common application of the self-critical analysis privilege
occurs within the context of the academic peer review function. In this context
a qualified privilege for the peer review process conducted by colleges and
50 See Note, Criticizing the Self-Criticism Privilege, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 675, 678; Note,
Discovery of Affirmative Action Plans, 83 MICH. L. REV. 405, 408 (1984) ("[tlhe self-critical
analysis privilege was originally invoked to protect a hospital committee's investigatory
report in Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, a medical malpractice case"); James F. Flanagan,
Rejectinga GeneralPrivilegefor Self-CriticalAnalyses, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 551,554(1983);
Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV- 1083 (1983).
51 Discovery of Affirmative Action Plans, supra note 50, at 409 (citations omitted).
Courts declining to recognize the self-evaluative privilege: Nazareth Literary &
Benevolent Inst. v. Stephenson, 503 S.W.2d 177,179 (Ky. App. 1973) (court stated that
"claims of privilege are carefully scrutinized and impediments to the discovery of truth
are afforded validity in relatively few instances"); Shibilski v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 266
N.W.2d 264 (Wis. 1978) (court would not judicially recognize a self-criticism privilege
on the basis that only the legislature can create a privilege).
52 Note, Making Sense of Rules of Privilege Under the Structural (Il)logic of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1339, 1351 (1992). See also The Privilege of Self-Critical
Analysis, supra note 50, at 1083 ("a privilege of self-critical analysis has developed to
shield certain institutional self-analyses from discovery").
53Criticizing the Self-Criticism Privilege, supra note 50, at 680. The author notes that
although "the practical scope of the privilege remains undefined," id., courts have
consistently applied it to three types of documents---"committee or peer review reports,
corporate internal investigation documents, and affirmative action forms voluntarily
recorded in compliance with federal equal employment opportunity statutes." Id. at 681
(footnote omitted) (further concluding that these documents differ so greatly the court's
recognition of them provides "inadequate precedent for courts to utilize in evaluating
claims of the privilege"). Id. The author further notes that the application of Professor
Wigmore's conditions for the recognition of a privilege does not support the
self-criticism privilege. Id. at 683-84.
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universities when considering promotion and tenure of professors was first
recognized in 1981.54 In 1983, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized
a qualified academic freedom privilege with respect to disclosure of the
identities of individuals participating in the university peer review tenure
process.55 However, the United States Supreme Court has refused to recognize
a common law privilege for peer review materials prepared in connection with
such promotion and tenure decisions.
56
As in the health care profession, the rationale for the recognition of such a
privilege with respect to academic peer review is based upon the reluctance of
individuals to participate in the process without assurances of confidentiality.
Without the certainty of confidentiality to those individuals participating in the
peer review process, commentators have argued that there will be a failure "to
foster honest, open criticism of faculty members under review. Indeed, the
institution's fear of possible future litigation might actually facilitate ad hoc,
discriminatory employment decisions without full consideration of the
applicant's merits and without benefit of accurate records."
57
Corporations have also attempted to use the self-evaluation privilege;
however, the success with which such corporations have maintained
confidentiality of certain internal documents has been founded on other
privileges-e.g., the attorney-client privilege and attorney work product
doctrine.
While the self-critical privilege has been applied successfully at times in the
context of academic peer review, it has not met with favor when applied to the
peer review procedures conducted within the health care profession.58
Moreover, because the privilege, when recognized, is characterized as a
"'qualified" privilege, courts hold that it only protects subjective as opposed to
factual or objective data contained in reports and that the privilege can be
overcome if the plaintiff can demonstrate its need for the information
5 4 See Comment, Balancing Academic Freedom and Civil Rights: Toward an Appropriate
Privilege for the Votes of Academic Peer Review Committees, 68 IowA L. REv. 585 (1983). See
also Recent Development,A Qualified Academic Freedom Privilege in Employment Litigation:
Protecting Higher Education or Shielding Discrimination?, 40 VAND. L. Ruv. 1397, 1398
(1987).
55 EEOC v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d 331,337 (7th Cir. 1983).
5 6 University of Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 182 (holding that university must respond
to EEOC subpoena for information because the applicable EEOC statute plainly
provides that the EEOC shall have access to relevant evidence).
57 Recent Development, supra note 54, at 1405-06 (arguing that reliance on judicial
discretion in determining on a case-by-case basis whether peer review proceedings will
be protected "provides uncertain and therefore unsatisfactory protection for the
universities' interest in confidentiality").
58 See Morgenstern v. Wilson, 133 F.R.D. 139 (D. Neb. 1990) (interest in enforcing
antitrust laws outweighs interest in protecting patients' records and peer review
committee's work); Wei v. Bodner, 127 F.R.D. at 91 (information sought in antitrust suit
against hospital was not protected by peer review privilege or self-evalua tive privilege).
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outweighs the public interest in prohibiting disclosure. In addition, the fact that
the privilege is applied entirely within the discretion of the court leads to its
application on a case-by-case basis with the result that one court may reach the
opposite conclusion as another court on identical facts. Therefore, the
self-criticism privilege should not be relied upon alone to provide protection
for peer review proceedings.
D. State Peer Review Privileges
In stark contrast to federal law, almost all states and the District of Columbia
recognize some type of peer review privilege.5 9 While at least one state court
has suggested that absent a statute, public policy might still dictate that
information regarding peer review proceedings not be admitted into court,60
most state privilege protections flow from statutory law. Despite almost
universal mention of peer review privilege, there is extremely wide variation
in the privilege granted by the states. The variation focuses on the types of
entities61 granted privilege protection, whether such protection is offered for
all judicial and administrative proceedings and the scope of the protection
granted.
1. Health Care Entity Proceedings Granted Protection
State statutes vary significantly in the types of health care facilities granted
peer review privilege protection. Most states protect peer review performed by
hospitals. Once outside the hospital context, there is broad variance in what
types of entities are offered protection for peer review activities. Some states
offer protection to peer review conducted by free-standing surgical centers and
health maintenance organizations.62 A very few offer protection to third party
payers.63
59The chart following this Article summarizes the state peer review statutes and the
protections afforded participants and proceedings.
60Bay Medical Center v. Sapp, 535 So. 2d 308,311 (Fla. App. 1988) (citations omitted).
6 1Committees performing peer review functions, which may include utilization
review and credentialing, governing boards, administration, and all varieties of health
care facilities, have been given statutory protection in some form. Individuals associated
with these entities, as members, employees, agents, and advisers, are also typically
included and given immunity from civil and/or criminal liability from damages and/or
suit.
62 For example, Delaware's peer review statute protects any committee appointed by
an HMO to perform quality review and makes the records and proceedings of such a
committee confidential and privileged. Kentucky's peer review statute provides similar
protection for HMOs. Louisiana's peer review statute protects and makes confidential
records of peer review committees of free-standing surgical centers, HMOs, and group
medical practices of 20 or more physicians.
63Kentucky includes review by health insurers within its peer review statute.
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Similarly there is little consistency about the type of information granted
protection at the facilities mentioned in the state statutes. For instance, Arizona
law broadly offers protection to review of professional privileges performed
by hospitals,64 while Ohio law provides protection only for utilization, quality
assurance, and tissue committees and hospital boards and committees
reviewing professional qualifications or activities of the hospital medical staff
or applicants for admission to the staff.65 Therefore, the Arizona statute would
offer protection to all hospital review of professional privileges, however that
review is done, and would include review performed by departments,
department chairmen and otherwise. Ohio's statute, in contrast, only protects
the proceedings of specific committees and the hospital board.66 The protection
afforded by Arizona, however, appears to be limited to traditional review of
professional credentials review, while the Ohio statute more broadly covers
ongoing review by named committees of any medical staff activities. Most of
the case law in the area of peer review centers around the issues of what is
6 4 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-445.01 (1993). In a recent case, Yuma Regional Medical
Center petitioned the Arizona Court of Appeals on the sole issue of whether it was
required to produce certain requested information. The medical center argued that to
provide the information would violate the peer review privilege conferred by §
36-445.01(A), which provides in pertinent part: "All proceedings, records and materials
prepared in connection with the reviews provided for in § 36-445, including all peer
reviews of individual health care providers ... and the records of such reviews, shall
be confidential and shall not be subject to discovery .... Discovery of the names of
participants in the peer review proceeding and a list of written or documentary items
submitted to the committee were sought. On both issues, the court found that the
plaintiffs were trying to "thwart" the privilege and held that neither type of information
was discoverable. The court specifically held:
The peer review privilege, A.R.S. § 36-445 et seq., protects from disclosure
the names of the participants in a peer review proceeding as well as the
listing of any written or documentary items submitted to the peer review
committee. Such information is inherent in the privilege as indicative of the
"discussions, exchanges and opinions" of the committee.
Yuma Regional Medical Center v. Superior Court, 852 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1993) (emphasis added).
6 5 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.251 (Anderson 1991).
6 6 Interestingly, and of great concern to hospital governing boards in Ohio, the Ohio
Supreme Court rejected a hospital's argument that certain information fell within the
peer review privilege. The Court was presented with a negligent credentialling claim
that was brought after traditional interpretations of the applicable statute of limitations
for such actions. The Court specifically found that the hospital was not involved in the
provision of information or participation on a peer review committee and therefore not
entitled to the immunities of OHIO REV. CODE § 2305.25. The Court also dismissed
without meaningful discussion the hospital's protest that it would be unable to defend
itself due to the prohibition of OHIO REV. CODE § 2305.251, which generally prohibits
disclosure of peer review committee proceedings and records. The Court stated that
information from other sources would beavailable to the hospital, ignoring the fact that
the very information it would need to defend itself against the negligent credentialling
claim involves the type and extent of peer review conducted by the hospital and its
medical staff. See generally Browning v. Burt, 613 N.E.2d 993, 1006 (1993).
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covered by the privilege and what is not covered, creating a crazy quilt effect
among the states.67 If the policy reasons for granting privilege to peer review
information exist, i.e., encouraging open and effective peer review to ultimately
increase the quality of medical care rendered, then this reason should exist
whether the peer review is conducted by a hospital, ambulatory surgery center,
an alternative delivery system, or other health care entity and regardless of how
it is performed within the institution. With the advent of credentialling
decisions being made by alternative delivery systems, extension of the
privilege to this setting may be important.68 While many credentialling
decisions at the third party payer level are not being made by peers but by the
administration of the third party payer, protection of this credentialling
information may be useful to encourage such review to be performed at all.
Currently if the information is not protected there may be a tendency for third
parties not to engage in the review for fear of retaliation by health care
professionals.
2. Scope of Privilege
There is wide variation by the states as to the scope of privilege. While
generally the privilege extends to civil actions, some states limit the
applicability of the privilege even in civil actions. Some states extend the
privilege to criminal and administrative actions, as well as civil actions.
a. Civil Actions
Some states, such as Alabama and California, offer broad privileges for civil
actions; peer review records are simply not admissible or discoverable in civil
actions. 69 Other states such as Arizona start out by offering similarly broad
protection, but then carve out large exceptions which provide that the
information may be obtained in actions by staff members against the entity
conducting the peer review for improper limitation of privileges.70
6 7 See, e.g., John C. Lincoln Hosp. and Health Ctr. v. Super. Ct. of Ariz., 768 P.2d 188
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Murphy v. Wood, 667 P.2d 859 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983); Lomano v.
Cigna Healthplan of Columbus, Inc., 582 N.E.2d 1150 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990), appeal
dismissed, 613 N.E.2d 1075 (1992); Community Hospitals of Indianapolis, Inc. v.
Medtronic, Inc., 594 N.E.2d 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Weiner v. Memorial Hosp. for
Cancer & Allied Diseases, 453 N.Y.S.2d 142 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982); Tyes v. St. Luke's Hosp.,
1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5735 Ohio Ct. App., Cuyahoga County Dec. 2, 1993); Cruger v.
Love, 599 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1992).
68 At least 12 states at this time specifically include peer review by entities such as
HMOs, PPOs, and other health care delivery systems in their peer review statutes.
6 9 ALA. CODE § 6-5-333 (1991) (limited to civil practice); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 805
(West Supp. 1994); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1156, 1157 (West Supp. 1994) (no distinction
between civil and criminal matters; peer review proceeding materials are not
discoverable or admissible in any court action or any administrative proceeding).
70ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-445.01 (1993).
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A relatively large number of states-Arkansas, Connecticut, 71 Florida,
Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Vermont and West Virginia-provide only that the information
shall not be discoverable or admissible in actions arising out of the subject of
review by the committee.72 The information would therefore be protected
against disclosure in actions brought against the entity for the peer review
process, but it is questionable whether the information would be protected
from discovery in malpractice actions unless the particular alleged error or
omission generating the malpractice action was the subject of the peer review
meeting. A Florida appeals court permitted discovery of peer review records
from one hospital in a malpractice case arising at a second hospital holding:
[W]here the circumstances giving rise to the suit were the very ones
considered in the committee evaluation, the documents and
transcribed proceedings of the said committee hearings are precluded
from discovery But if the subject matter of the suit and the subject of
the medical review committee evaluation are not the same, the statute
does not apply.
73
b. Criminal Actions
Some of the states that offer the peer review privilege in civil actions also
offer the privilege in criminal actions. Pennsylvania and Rhode Island both
provide that members and employees who furnish information or participate
in the peer review process will not be found to have violated any criminal law.
The Utah statute simply provides that participants will be immune from
liability. Most states simply state that the immunity of individual participants
is from civil damages or suits.
71The Connecticut peer review statute does not protect the discovery of facts; the
statute provides that the fact of restrictions or termination of privileges can be disclosed
in a civil action, together with the nature of the restrictions.
72 1n contrast, 19 states expressly recognize an exception to the peer review privilege
and allow discovery of peer review information when the physician under investigation
brings a civil action to challenge the peer review outcome. These states are: Alabama,
Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Washington, and West Virginia. Although West Virginia alsoprovides thatpeer
review information is not to be available for use in actions arising out of the peer review
activity, it allows use of the information in judicial actions reviewing the peer review
outcome, but specifically provides that the court "shall enter such protective orders as
may be appropriate to provide for the confidentiality of the records provided the court
.." W. VA. CODE § 30-3C-3 (1993).
73 Segal v. Roberts, 380 So. 2d 1049,1052 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 388 So.
2d 1117 (Fla. 1980).
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With respect to the proceedings themselves and the information acquired
and produced as a result of the peer review process, eight states74 provide that
the peer review records and proceedings are not subject to discovery, use or
admissible into evidence in any action of any kind, which appears to provide
protection from use in civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings. The peer
review protection statutes in five states 75 provide that such information is not
available for discovery or subpoena, leading to the conclusion that the
information is not available for criminal, civil or administrative matters. Until
the statutes have been judicially construed, the facial interpretation points to
the protection of peer review information in these states in civil, criminal, and
administrative proceedings. It is certainly understandable that, as a matter of
public policy, the states would be more restrictive in granting privileges in
criminal actions.
c. Administrative Actions
The states are split about whether peer review information can be admitted
into evidence in administrative actions. A number of state statutes specifically
provide that peer review information is not available to licensing bodies in
administrative actions, while a number of states take an opposite approach and
specifically do permit the information to be admitted in licensing actions. At
least one court has interpreted a statute which provided for judicial privilege
not to include a privilege for administrative proceedings. Since the advent of
the HCQIA, arguably this distinction is less important, because any significant
peer review sanctions taken by hospitals as a result of peer review will be
reported to state licensing agents and to the NPDB.
3. Waiver
The issue of waiver of peer review privilege is particularly interesting. Many
privileges such as the attorney-client and physician-patient privilege provide
that the privilege may be waived by one of the parties to the communication.
Most of the states that provide a privilege for peer review information do not
provide any way in which the privilege may be waived.76 Without such a
statutory waiver, it is unlikely that the court will permit the privilege to be
waived.
If the privilege is truly an institutional privilege, protecting the participants
in the process, then waiver, if permitted at all, should be exercised by the
participants and not by the person who was the subject of the review. Despite
this, Nebraska provides for specific waiver of the privilege by the patient whose
information is being discussed in the peer review proceedings. Certainly the
74Idaho, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, South
Dakota, and Utah.
7 5 Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Tennessee.
76Six states offer a specific way in which to waive the statutory privilege or
confidentiality provided in the peer review statute.
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patient is not going to be particularly interested in the sanctity of the peer
review process, but will be more concerned about his or her feelings about the
physician or how release of the information may impact any pending
malpractice action. Permitting the patient to waive the privilege may render it
almost meaningless. New Hampshire appears to understand the rationale
behind the privilege and permits the hospital board to waive the hospital peer
review privilege. Texas, similarly, allows the peer review committee to waive
the privilege of confidentiality; however, the waiver must be in writing and
signed by the committee chair, vice-chair, or secretary.77 Permitting the board
to waive the privilege may not provide particular comfort for the physicians
on the medical staff who have participated in peer review proceedings and who
are expected to participate in such proceedings as part of their medical staff
responsibilities.
In a very interesting case, West Covina Hospital v. Superior Court,78 the
California Supreme Court held that the California privilege statute, which
provided that a peer review participant could not be required to testify about
peer review proceedings, did not preclude a participant from voluntarily
testifying as to the proceedings. The court reasoned that the privilege statute
was to protect physician's time from being burdened with required testimony.
The court further reasoned that if a physician volunteered to testify, then the
physician obviously chose to bear the burden of testifying. Obviously,
interpretations such as West Covina would render absolutely meaningless what
peer review privilege protection exists as physicians would always be
concerned that one of the participants would choose voluntarily to disclose the
proceedings. 79
If the policy reasons for the peer review privilege exist, the states do not
appear to be successful in advancing those policies. Participants in the peer
review process are generally not guaranteed that they will not be called to
testify against a colleague about what transpired in peer review in some future
action. Some commentators have, however, argued that the privilege is
unnecessary.80 If the true fear of peer review participation is the "potential fear
felt by the reviewer that participation in an adverse recommendation will lead
77 The Texas statute also allows any individual or entity who participated in peer
review and who is then named as a defendant in a civil action to use otherwise
confidential information to present a defense to the charges. The plaintiff is then also
entitled to disclose records or other peer review information to rebut the information
supplied by the defendant. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 5.06(j) (West Supp.
1994).
78718 P.2d 119 (Cal. 1986).
79 Perhaps for this reason many state peer review statutes provide that individual
members or advisors to peer review committees will not be required or permitted to
testify as to what transpired at the committee meetings or any of its deliberations.
80See Goldberg, suipra note 5.
1992-931
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
to a lawsuit against him or her personally,"81 peer review immunity statutes
should protect against such suits and privilege statutes should not be necessary
for such protection. "Regrettably, the widespread adoption of the privilege
cannot be justified in view of its limited benefits and its adverse impact upon
a patient's ability to show negligence.'
82
V. CONFIDENTIALITY
Confidentiality and privilege are two compatible, yet distinct, concepts.
Privilege addresses a person's right not to have another testify as to certain
matters as part of a judicial process, while confidentiality addresses the
obligation to refrain from disclosing information to third parties other than as
part of legal process. Confidentiality may be imposed by law or by agreement.
In many cases, if there is a privilege against testifying, there is also a
requirement to keep information confidential; for instance, many states which
recognize the attorney-client privilege or physician-patient privilege also
provide that the attorney or physician can be subject to state license disciplinary
action for willful betrayal of a professional confidence. 83 This is, however, not
the case with all privileges. For example, although the spousal privilege
prevents one spouse from testifying against another regarding certain
communications, a spouse is not required by law to keep all spousal
communications confidential outside of the judicial context. Indeed tabloids
and other publications might not survive if it were not for the telling of spousal
secrets. The only recourse of a spouse against another for telling secrets may
be to stop talking to the spouse or divorce.
In the case of peer review, voluntary revelation of peer review findings may
be particularly damaging to the process. As discussed previously with respect
8 1 Scibetta, supra note 5, at 1033.
8 2 1d. See also Clark C. Havighurst, Professional Peer Review and the Antitrust Laws, 36
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1117, 1118 (1986), in which Professor Havighurst concludes that
"[e]ncrusting the law with special exceptions forprivileged groups or special treatment
for particular activities is a poor approach precisely because it relieves courts of the
necessity to rethink basic antitrustdoctrine to makecertain that itfrustrates onlyconduct
that is truly incompatible with competition and consumer welfare."
For the view of the judiciary finding the privilege inappropriate, see also Ott v. St.
Luke Hosp. of Campbell County, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 706 (E.D. Ky. 1981), in which the
court held that there was no showing that the hospital peer review committees'
functions
would be substantially impaired by denial of the privilege. Indeed, the
true efficacy of such committees may be fostered by an atmosphere of
openness, in that they may be less likely to rely on hearsay or informa-
tion tainted by bias or prejudice in making their decisions, if the under-
lying reasons therefor can be required to be disclosed in a proper case.
Id. at 711.
8 3 For example, Ohio's Medical Practice Act, OHIO REV. CODE Ch. 4731, provides that
"[wlillfully betraying a professional confidence..." constitutes grounds for discipline
by the state medical board. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B)(4) (Anderson Supp. 1992).
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to the West Covina case, the ability of one participant in the peer review process
to waive the privilege and disclose information from the proceeding without
the consent of the entire group or health care facility administration cuts at the
very basis of the concept-protection of certain information, usually
considered in a committee setting and any decision or recommendation arising
from that committee review, from disclosure on the basis that individual
participants will be more willing to participate openly and honestly if their
comments and recommendations are not made known outside the context of
the proceeding.
A. State Law
Eighteen of the states that provide privilege protection to peer review
information-Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Kansas, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New
York, Oregon, South Dakota, Virginia, and Washington 84-do not mention the
confidentiality of such information in the statute.85 Therefore, while the
admissibility of such information during judicial or administrative process will
be governed by the state law on privileges, the peer review participants are free
to voluntarily discuss peer review information as they choose. One way to help
ensure that committee members keep any information confidential is to have
them individually agree to maintain confidentiality as one of their committee
responsibilities. Medical staffs can also provide for confidentiality by including
such provisions in the medical staff bylaws and also obtaining appointees'
specific agreement to abide by this provision at the time of appointment and
reappointment to the staff as a specific condition of appointment.
Seventeen states-Arizona, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming-and the
District of Columbia simply mention, in conjunction with granting a privilege,
that the peer review information is to remain confidential. Since almost all the
states mention the confidentiality in the same clause as the description of
privilege, 86 it could be argued that the confidentiality language actually applies
solely to thejudicial context and is part of the privilege granted, but is not meant
to give rise to any actionable requirement that the peer review participants keep
the information confidential. If this is the case, thirty-five states grant little or
no confidentiality protection to peer review proceedings. Even if this is not the
84 Refer to the chart following the text for statutory cites and a brief description of the
statutory provisions.
85Although there is no express discussion of "confidentiality" in the statute, the
statutes of Arkansas and Maryland title one section of the peer review statute
"Proceedings and Records Confidential" and "Proceedings, Records and Files
Confidential," respectively.
86 For example, the Michigan statute states that information from review functions
performed by review committees of hospital medical staffs is confidential and is not
available by subpoena. MICH. COMp. LAWS§§ 333.21515, 333.21513(d) (1993).
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case, the statutes offer no sanction for violation of the confidentiality
requirement. Presumably, therefore, if participants in the peer review process
see fit to discuss the proceedings with, for example, third party payers, other
health care facilities, or the news media, they are free to do so without fear of
recourse.
The peer review statutes of Alabama, Delaware, Louisiana, North Dakota,
and Ohio all provide that peer review information is to remain confidential and
only be used in the exercise of proper functions of the committee. This language
at least implies that the reference to confidentiality is not meant to be limited
to judicial privilege and that there is an affirmative obligation to keep the
information confidential. Alaska broadly provides that all information and
data of a peer review committee may not be disclosed to anyone.
A number of states provide that peer review information is to remain
confidential and provide specific instances when the information may be
released. For example, Indiana permits release to other peer review and
professional organizations as well as state disciplinary boards; South Carolina
permits the professional who is the subject of review to authorize the release
to third parties; Tennessee permits the information to be used as advocacy for
the professional before other peer review bodies; and Texas permits a judge to
authorize the disclosure in an anti-trust action.87 Colorado, while stating that
peer review information is to remain confidential, affirmatively permits the
voluntary release of all such information, provided there are no patient
identifiers. Penalties for unlawful disclosure are imposed by only 2 of the states
identified above-Alabama and Minnesota.8 8
New Mexico, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wisconsin are the only states
which appear to fully appreciate the concept of confidentiality as distinct from
privilege and provide sanctions for peer review participants' failure to keep
the information confidential. Both New Mexico and Rhode Island provide
criminal sanctions for violation of the confidentiality requirement and provide
8 7This would imply that the confidentiality provision is not meant as a separate legal
requirement but applies only to the privilege from admission in judicial proceedings.
88 1n all, only 6 states provide penalties for violation of statutory peer review
confidentiality requirements-Alabama, Minnesota, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Texas,
and Wisconsin. In addition, Ohio allows a right of action against a member of a
utilization or quality assurance committee, "similar to that a patient may have against
an attending physician for misuse of information, data, reports, or records arising out
of the physician-patient relationship .... for misuse of information, data, reports, and
records furnished to the committee by an attending physician." OHiO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2305.24 (Anderson 1991). This provision has not been judicially interpreted, but it
would not appear to apply to information reviewed or generated by a peer review
committee since the following statutory section, § 2305.25, discusses separately quality
assurance and peer review committees. Section 2305.24 defines "utilization committee"
as "the committee established to administer a utilization review plan of a hospital...."
If peer review were included as a function of the utilization review plan, then arguably
the cause of action provided for misuse of information provided to utilization
committees would also apply to misuse of information provided to peer review
committees.
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for fines and potential jail sentences. Ohio and Wisconsin expressly permit civil
damage actions against those breaching the confidentiality requirements.8 9
It is interesting to note that the existence of sanctions for violation of
confidentiality may actually discourage active peer review participation if a
participant realized he or she could later be subject to sanctions for revealing
what was known about the process. Presumably, however, participants in the
process are used to protecting patient confidences and are comfortable with the
notion of confidentiality.
A review of the case law on peer review revealed almost no interpretation
of peer review confidentiality status. The West Covina case discussing the
permissibility of voluntary testimony even in the face of a privilege statute was
the sole case to address the issue of participants voluntarily revealing peer
review information.
B. Federal Law
Public demand for physician accountability led to the enactment of HCQIA,
which resulted in the establishment in 1990 of the NPDB. Pursuant to HCQIA,
the following must be reported to the NPDB: certain adverse actions regarding
medical staff membership or clinical privileges taken by hospitals and other
health care providers which engage in peer review activities; adverse actions
taken by professional review societies regarding their members; payments on
certain malpractice claims; and adverse actions taken by state licensing boards.
Information submitted to the NPDB later may be obtained by the following:
hospitals acting upon medical staff membership or clinical privileges; other
health care providers which engage in professional review activities or contract
with health care professionals; health care professionals regarding themselves;
state licensing boards; and, in very limited circumstances, parties to
malpractice actions.
The NPDB regulations provide that any person or entity which receives
information directly or indirectly from the NPDB must consider such
information confidential and use the information solely with respect to the
purpose for which it was provided; however, nothing prevents disclosure of
information which is "authorized" under applicable state law. Violations of this
confidentiality regulation are subject to a civil monetary penalty of up to
$10,000 for each violation. 90 As shown, a great number of states do not require
confidentiality of peer review information. The lack of a confidentiality
mandate however, arguably does not "authorize the release of such
information." Therefore, to be safe, health care providers should maintain the
confidentiality of NPDB information. Outside of the NPDB information,
89Remember that Ohio's cause of action appears to be limited to misuse of
information provided to a utilization review or quality assurance committee by an
attending physician. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.24 (Anderson 1991).'
9045 C.F.R. § 60.13(a).
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however, HCQIA does not give rise to any federal law requirement that peer
review information remain confidential.
VI. MAXIMIZING WHAT LIMITED PEER REVIEW PROTECTION EXISTS
Health care providers when faced with performing peer review must be
concerned with maximizing what limited peer review protection exists. Clearly
the first step is for the provider to understand the peer review privilege and
confidentiality statutes as they exist in the provider's state. For peer review
privilege, if a court orders discovery of peer review records, there is little a
provider can do once the provider has challenged the court's order and lost.
The planning to maximize the peer review privilege statutes, to the extent that
they exist, must arise prior to the request for documents. Clearly, a health care
provider should understand the statute in that state, and tailor the peer review
activities in that state to the statue. For instance, if the statute only grants peer
review privilege protection to proceedings of certain committees, the hospital
should provide in its bylaws that peer review is only performed by those
committees. All administrative and departmental review and other peer review
activities should take place as part of the committee process and not as an
independent process. Any peer review proceeding or meeting of a peer review
committee should be kept strictly confidential. Any minutes or documents
generated as a result of that meeting or proceeding should be clearly labeled
as peer review materials and maintained in a secure place. Peer review
functions should be clearly described in any statements of policies or
procedures identifying committee duties so that no question can be raised that
the entity performing the peer review activity was acting within its proper
authority and therefore entitled to any available protections. Such policies and
procedures should include a description of the types of information that can
be disclosed without violating the statutory confidentiality requirements, such
as the facts underlying the investigation or the fact that an investigation is
taking place or has taken place and any resulting restrictions on privileges or
the termination of privileges and staff appointment.
With respect to peer review performed by entities for which there is no
statutory protection, these entities could attempt to "piggy back" onto the peer
review performed by protected entities. For example, a provider-controlled
preferred provider organization may wish to rely upon hospital peer review
rather than performing independent peer review.
Similarly to protect the confidentiality of peer review proceedings, all health
care providers should contractually provide that peer review participants will
keep the information confidential. Hospital bylaws should provide that it is a
requirement of sitting on the medical staff that physicians who participate in
peer review keep all information confidential, and it would be advisable as part
the appointment process to any peer review committee that each participant
sign an agreement to keep the information confidential. This gives rise to a
contractual claim for breach of contract should any participant breach the
confidentiality and voluntarily testify or divulge peer review information.
Such contractual provisions, however, would in all probability only be able to
be enforced by the health care provider securing the agreement and not by
other participants in the peer review process. Therefore, should a peer review
participant violate the confidentiality of the process and reveal information
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which is damaging to another participant in the proceeding, but not damaging
to the health care facility itself, it is questionable whether or not that damaged
participant would have a cause of action against the individual who breached
the confidentiality, unless such argument was on some type of third party
beneficiary claim. Health care facilities performing peer review may, therefore,
want to consider contractually obligating all parties in a manner in which each
party to the contract would have a cause of action against any other party.
Of course, seeking and entertaining statutory changes is also a free course to
health care providers who determine that sufficient peer review protection
does not exist in their state. In the meantime, current laws are subject to
conflicting interpretation by courts on nearly identical facts. While a health care
facility cannot be absolutely certain that its peer review activities will withstand
a court's scrutiny, the best approach is to continue to fulfill its peer review
obligations, as required by state and federal law, as well as accreditation
organizations, and to treat all peer review activities and attendant records and
information, including deliberations and work product, of any meetings and
proceedings as highly confidential. Communicating both the importance of
maintaining confidentiality to preserve the effectiveness of the process and the
potential liabilities for both individual participants and sponsoring entities will
encourage the observance of a high degree of confidentiality by those
participating in the process. Adding bylaw provisions and requiring separate
agreements of physicians to maintain the confidentiality of any peer review
proceedings and materials will help ensure that health care entities, and those
individuals performing peer review functions for them, will be in a position to
argue for the greatest protections available under applicable law for peer
review information.
1992-93]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 7:169
62 A
I-~ vi' .
0. z >0
.2 ah 
2 
Lo 20
0 0
~0 3 ,
~ g~!. & ~
oa oz 22
2>.- 5,, 0 -
A0 0 W 0 > -z0 
0 0 ~ O .
~~~~- .u- E.
<1 2f E-0oo.0 ~ .
1.22
> 0 30
0 0>
0 .12
22 2
IV P~g 3 Z 2 1 ~ 2is
~ 0
Li ~. o 00* 0 -
PEER REVIEW INFORMATION
e .2 .0
0 0 -5
zo 0...
00aF
.-. 2 . .2
2.02
, .0
8M
o 0~~-;*; ~z2 ~- .00
~F~Z d
~ .~ii
o .
•
* ...- .
.2 o .2.2
3" "
. .*0
o .-
.~ o o'"
o "€) 
"
".- "
. o0 .0
', "0
. " o2 .
-o
gim
1992-931
.24
.00
>.
~**~ i~L
iii
0>FF
11
~- 2~
10
"08
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
t~ 4
I
I
I 0
0. 00 U[
U ~
58 >~
?0= 0
M 2 o
.1 .e
I
C
.2
I 4.5
CC)
o
80 .
0
.- .
= o
&- 8 .8.
,.p
0
2c
0 L
[Vol. 7:169
PEER REVIEW INFORMATION
0 2 il
00o >2 =0 m.- t-
!, '41 2-
Lo H , .
* 0 . c
0 . "[ 
r.a
c i
o .> 2
o20
=o..
t ~. <
<- 0000 0
1992-93]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
00, U '
- 0 N
S "
I' o
u9(o
o
[Vol. 7:169
o !
, 0
a
-J C
4
0
0
z
is
C.
I!
U, C
S
I"I-
0 o~
C. 2~
I
~
I~ I
0 >'-.
~J a
2-a
- C 0
c.0 S~
004.0 2
(Jz -.~A
I- -- '0-..
> '-'00
hi
0
o ~e~c~Z
c-i <Z~-
hi
F-
4
4
z
PEER REVIEW INFORMATION
- E . .00 . - *.
F7 ..-R - -
0 1 ~ *
-0 .5
0 -A
: .£ o ' .
-, o.-0 B
zr
0 1 o2 . 5 ~
0 ~w00
z ci
1992-93]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
i I
N 0. .'2 .-0
R a 4 a
~~2 1
[Vol. 7:169
21F-.
U21
F-o
~
H
.2 0
t~.
21
C-)z -~
it
~:
21
0
U at
21
I-
4
0
PEER REVIEW INFORMATION
A! m
0 a~!
0
2 .
1.0 -0 OR -r U
o 2o =2 1U r:0.
z!o J-
5
g ~ o a
~j.1
t; I00oR1
U 'r,
2.E B ~ O
Do> 0>
~ H 10.
>: Z
1992-93]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
.i.
8 . 0 .. o
I . -. -
>. e., ...:-o 8__ ..
2 oA88 "
* o8 -
- , .. .=0z
4 8 .-
[Vol. 7:169
PEER REVIEW INFORMATION
.. .!i_
8o - .
o - 90>
~ ,
.0*
0.0 00u
9.6 ~ 'j >
_0 C) 0
~;
b0
*00
o
* .
z
0
1992-93]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
>0
S 0 0> 0 ~ ~ ..
0~~ >- >>
...... 5.
V 00 . MR
.01
~ .. 2
zo 2
!L w**
z z
[Vol. 7:169
PEER REVIEW INFORMATION
Al~.
Ore 0
0P 0
0 ;
._ 2.- . ... •
oSo
co -, .8
0 0 .
00
_z _
0 o
.0 5.9 o
._
u u
i2
z-
0..0
.2
1992-931
.~ .~ ~ I
2
~4 ii
~
0 0 =
~' 8 ~
0.2'i
00~0 0
~ .~
*;2~5 *~I ~
* * .0 0.* 0.
-
.. .2
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 7:169
I n - _ ,. ... 
0~ 8 -~~ 2 I 
.o
0
<>
r 0 o=
0 AU 0 
n8 0 ~ A
oo E g
e. - ~ n o 80 05 - e0 & o .
j a 
0 0e~~.1 1.Q
LI 0 c
0 .~
01 
'
a u
U
0~ a~
PEER REVIEW INFORMATION
9V C
..1 2  C . -- = = _
aaa
" 6 - . . " .
o o
•-mf-:
*CCO u A -
N - .0.
04
cO.S
N ',C 0 a. ,
o 0
o g:
1992-93]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
00
o - .
.= .  . . . S.
oo
r H .
•i-'rvii 2
is .s:
o~S
o So>
~
I
H
.2c
1
U
a32.-
0 0 fl
88
I S
01 u
o. a
*0
I- -
U~
I-
C
Ca
~ Ii
[Vol. 7:169
1992-93] PEER REVIEW INFORMATION
0 0 0
0 ~ e- 8 ae~* -
0 9 *-o I ~ C2*~
o ~0 V* s -
i2 - j .0 ,
e0-~ -4 S -gIt o . 2
o -r >" 0 j ' Q .
> ' 8
~~ 0 &0..
=S
'- ' 20 a
'i. CL~ 8z
C ) 4< C
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
"0:
o
I. el oo
o " >~
!
.So~ .
- .J
zr.
[Vol. 7:169
_ . ... S
~ ~.s oa'
* o a oF. '.U.-
7- '  . .
. ' .
1992-93] PEER REVIEW INFORMATION
= v 0
~. 0.
o "0 .= ,
zz
-0 >
"-8 -
ci
. ,. oo o0*.o - .
.0 05
'.-- 8 ' & =~. 8 8 0, ,
a:.. o . o .
0~
:.l I
I0 -6 ! S
>~0 0'. -8- .i 0'
.8-8 . = ,, .
S 58 0
..-..
* . . .. .- * .
0.
[,,,1
r S S "<>C
o 3~
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
"a
o s 8.t
4
-:P
z
8
U -
1 . ,
ZS --
.£ :
!2
~2 -4
.2
-
.*2
-
[Vol. 7:169
PEER REVIEW INFORMATION
-~ -.- o
U *.2
• - o .--o E
Ii
-u .
8 Is
I. z
1992-93]

